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ABSTRACT : This paper examines the perceptions of sustainability, which is conceptualised as 
cross-generational social preferences, on the formation of international environmental agreements (IEAs) 
in a two-stage game in two periods. There are two scenarios are considered: myopic and sustainable 
development scenarios. The myopic scenario assumes the decision makers only concern the present 
welfare. Whilst the scenario of sustainable development has two characters: cross-generational fairness 
and altruism. When both are taken into account, a coalition will be expanded. The numerical example 
indicates that the marginal cost of the total emissions is the crucial factor for the formation of IEAs. Only 
when the marginal cost is low, a sustainable system can be succeeded. While, the technological 
advancement may lead to a more efficient production per unit of emissions, it also encourages countries 
to emit more in total and have a lower level of welfare. The results confirm the importance of 
sustainability to IEAs. The lesson learnt from this study is: when decision makers are myopic, the system 
is unsustainable even if an IEA is formed. Only when the perception of sustainability is considered, the 
system could be sustainable. Regardless of the existence of IEAs, international environmental 
conventions shall not neglect the fundamental goal to pursue sustainable development. 
Keywords : Sustainable development, International environmental agreements, Climate change, Social 
preferences 
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I. Introduction
Human activities have left many enduring footprints and legacies. As a result, the 
ecosystems on earth have changed dramatically due to the rapid industrial development 
in the past decades. Our society is now facing a range of environmental crises. Actions 
are urged to maintain basic needs of the future generations, because the outcome of 
human development is often irreversible and will be passed on to the next generations. 
When environmental problems occur across boundaries, it is believed that signing 
international environmental agreements (IEAs) is the most viable solution to controlling 
the problems.
The most common purpose of the existing IEAs is to assure sustainable development. 
The term ‘sustainable development’ is first used in the report Our Common Future, 
published by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) in 
1987. In that publication, it is defined as ‘‘development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs’’.
Lately, ‘sustainability’ and ‘sustainable development’ have become buzzwords overloaded 
with fuzzy meanings. At the discussion of IEAs, stakeholders such as governments, 
industries, NGOs, trade unions, academics all have different understandings of 
‘sustainability’. For instance, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 declares that ‘... Such a level should be achieved within a 
time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure 
that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in 
a sustainable manner’ (UNFCCC, 1992, p. 4). In 1997, the UNFCCC states in the Kyoto 
Protocol that ‘Each Party included in Annex I, in achieving its quantified emissions 
limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3, in order to promote sustainable 
development’ (Kyoto Protocol, 1997, Article 2). Although sustainability has been 
inscribed in many formal and informal talks and documents, and is a key goal for IEAs, 
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there are miscellaneous ways to define and achieve it.
1. Literature Review
Based on a literature review, the concept of sustainability can be categorised at three 
levels: individual, societal, and the ecosystem levels. To individuals, sustainability 
usually means to achieve constant utility (Solow, 1974 and Hartwich, 1977) and avoid 
any decline in utility (Pearce et al. 1989; Pezzey, 1997). More precisely, employing 
utility as a measuring tool, Pezzey (ibid) identifies three distinct stages for classifying 
sustainability: sustainable level, sustained level, and survivable level. 
Other definitions of sustainability in the societal level include the WCED’s concept of 
satisfying the basic needs of the future generations (WCED, 1987); the length of the 
existence of the human race is maximised (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971); the present value 
of the social welfare is not declining (Riley, 1980); and the per capita incomes of the 
future generations are no worse off (Pearce et al, ibid). The indicators of sustainability at 
this level comprise the idealistic social welfare and the empirical statistical figures (such 
as Green Net National Product expanded by Hartwick, 1977 and Genuine Savings 
provided by Hamilton and Clemens, 1999).
Moving on to the ecosystem, levels of sustainability can be measured and evaluated 
against a wide range of indicators which include exhaustible natural resources 
(Meadows et al, 1972), renewable natural resources, production waste, and biological 
diversity. In order to achieve sustainability, exhaustible resources, such as minerals and 
fossil fuel deposits, have to be extracted at a rate at which the length of use is maximised. 
Renewable resources, such as fisheries and forests, have to be harvested at a natural and 
manageable speed of regeneration. In addition, biological diversity also has to be 
maintained for the basic needs of the survival development.
In a nutshell, the previous studies have proposed three main types of policy goals for 
sustainability: (1) achieving constant or non-declining individual utility function 
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(Solow, 1974 and Pezzy, 1997); (2) avoiding any decline in social values from the 
present time onwards (Riley, 1980); and (3) maintaining existing ‘safe minimum 
standards’ (Toman, 1994). These can be applied onto management of natural exhaustible 
resources and renewable resources and waste emissions (Solow, 1974 and Stiglitz, 
1974).
In order to avoid any decline in social present value, Woodward (2000) identifies a set 
of behaviours that would lead to sustainable life; these behaviours entail intergenerational 
fairness. This means that the future generations will not envy the present one, and there 
exists an alternative, feasible choice that there is no envy between generations. 
Woodward's ethical assumption emphasises the current generation's responsibility to the 
future generations. That said, the current generation has to consider not only their present 
welfare but also the welfare of future generations. Woodward's concept of sustainability 
emphasises the notion of fairness across generations.
Toman (1994) discusses the concept of `safe minimum standard' when speaking of 
strong sustainability. Because human activities have ‘irreversible’ effects on natural 
environments, the human capital cannot substitute the natural assets when decision 
makers have low level of information but high potential asymmetry in the payoff. 
Similarly, Barbier and Markandya (1990) suggest to impose a minimum stock of 
environmental assets as a safety reserve. According to their theory, when the asset is 
driven below this safety criterion, environmental degradation will destroy the natural 
clean-up and regenerative processes in the environment. Following these concepts, 
Martinet (2011) proposes an approach that defines the objectives of sustainability using 
sustainability threshold indicators.
Though the importance of sustainability to IEAs is widely approved, relatively little 
attention has been paid to discuss the relationship between the sustainable development 
process and the formation of IEAs. The majority of the theoretical studies have 
employed static models to analyse the coalition formation (e.g. Barrett, 1994, 2005; Yi, 
1997 and Carraro and Siniscalco, 1998). These static models do not reflect the practical 
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discussion in the environmental conventions, and fail to take the concept of sustainability 
which emphasises the moral relationship between generations into account.
Recent studies (e.g. Germain et al. 2003; de Zeeuw, 2008; Rubio and Ulph, 2007) 
employ dynamic models to describe human development in the infinite horizon. These 
models, pursues the maximised over-generational welfare, neglect the core of 
sustainability which pursues the non-declining welfare. That said, the cross-generational 
social preferences are hardly considered in the existing literature. 
This paper, to my best knowledge, is the first to consider cross-generational altruism 
and fairness in an economic model for IEAs. This paper recognises that there are 
different definitions of sustainability and various ideas of how it can be achieved. This 
study considers the perceptions of sustainability by building a cross-generational model 
with a two-stage game in two periods. The decision makers in different periods are 
considered as agents of two generations, young and old. In each period, they decide 
whether or not to participate in an IEA in the first stage. In terms of their membership 
status, the emissions levels are determined in the second stage. To examine the effect of 
different perceptions of sustainability on the formation of IEAs, we consider two 
scenarios: in the myopic (MYO) scenario, the decision makers of the old generation care 
about their own welfare. In the sustainable development (SD) scenario, the decision 
makers of the old generation care about not only the present welfare but also the welfare 
of the young generation. The old generation attempts to maximise the over-generational 
welfare and ensure that the welfare of the young generation is no worse off than the 
young one.
The model in the SD scenario presented in this paper will take the diversity of 
perceptions of sustainability into account. The cross-generational altruism denotes that 
the current decision makers would consider the welfare of the future generation as well 
as the present welfare. The cross-generational fairness imposes a sustainability criterion 
demanding for non-declining social welfare. The criterion dictates that the social welfare 
of the future generation should not be worse than that of the present generation. In so 
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doing, this paper re-defines ‘sustainability’ by providing a more balanced perspective on 
present the welfare of the present and the future generations, and the dynamics in the 
decision-making process. 
The results provide some policy implications: when decision makers are myopic, the 
system is unsustainable even if an IEA is formed. Only when the perceptions of 
sustainability are taken into account, a sustainable system could succeed. Regardless of 
the existence of IEAs, international environmental conventions should not neglect the 
fundamental goal to pursue sustainable development.
In addition, the numerical results suggest that the marginal cost of the total emissions 
plays an important role. The higher the marginal cost is, the lower the individual 
emissions level. A grand coalition formation is possibly formed when the marginal cost 
is very small. Besides, the cross-generational concerns have small but ambiguous impact 
on the coalition formation in two periods.
The study is structured as follows. In Section two, a two-stage two-period game is 
built in two scenarios. A numerical example in Section 3 illustrates the coalition 
formation in different scenarios. The conclusion and discussion are in the final section.
II. The model
This study investigates the cross-generational preferences based on a model that 
focuses on the frameworks of IEAs and ignore individualities. This assumption of 
identical countries is drawn on Barrett (1994), Rubio and Ulph (2007) and Breton et al. 
(2010) which assume countries are homogeneous in their analyses of incentives of 
participating in IEAs. I appreciate to the assumption of heterogeneous players, however, 
we have emphasised the point in the introduction: to my best understanding, there is no 
paper which model sustainability in the discussion of the formation of IEAs.
Table 1 shows the decision process of the model. The decision makers live for one 
period only: the old generation lives in Period 1 and the young generation lives in Period 
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<Table 1> The decision process of the model
Time horizon Period 1 Period 2
Player Old generation Young generation
2-stage game Membershipgame
Emission
game
Membership
game
Emission
game
Total emission   
  

 
  

   
  

  
  


Objective function
(MYO scenario)
Nonsignatory : 
Signatory : ∏
Nonsignatory : 
Signatory : ∏
Objective function
(SD scenario)
Nonsignatory :  
≤
Signatory : ∏ ∏
∏≤∏
Nonsignatory : 
Signatory : ∏
2. In each period, there is a two-stage game: in the first stage membership game, 
countries decide whether or not to participate in an IEA. In the second stage emission 
game, they make the decision on the level of emissions in terms of their membership 
status. Nonsignatories choose emissions in a non-cooperative way to maximise their 
own payoffs, whilst signatories act as one to maximise the coalition payoff. The total 
stock of emissions is the sum of the accumulated emissions from the past and the 
aggregated emissions in that period. In order to understand the importance of 
sustainability to the formation of IEAs, this study focuses on the coalition formation in 
two scenarios: the myopic (MYO) and the sustainable development (SD) scenarios. 
There is a finite set of N identical countries and each country determines its stock of 
emissions. It is built on the fact that the pollutant is a by-product of production. 
Obviously, the stock of pollutant has a strong positive correlation with industrial 
processes. The normalised benefit function from the production can be presented as 
    
 
where    denotes the emissions level1) of a country  in Period , ∈{1,…,} and ∈
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{1,2}. The parameter  is the benefit elasticity of emission where ∈(0,1). This 
assumption of a concave benefit function implies the diminishing rate of returns. When 
emissions are generated from the production, the marginal benefit will decrease. It 
should be noted that the benefit elasticity of emission   is a constant2) and determined by 
available technology level, or management of the production process. Higher benefit 
elasticity implies advanced technology which brings a higher benefit per unit of 
emissions. This elasticity measures the correspondent of benefit against the change in 
level of emissions stock. For example, =0.5 means that a 1% increase in emissions 
stock would lead to approximately 0.5% increase in benefit. 
On the other hand, the pollutant also causes severe damage to the environment. The 
damage cost function for country  is highly correlated with the global stock of 
emissions and can be presented in a linear function as 
  
where  is the marginal cost of the total stock of emissions   where >0. The total stock 
of emissions contains the accumulated emissions from the past and the aggregate 
emissions generated by the signatories and the nonsignatories denoted as 
≡    ∑      ∑       (Eqn. 1)
(Eqn. 1) can be read as the total stock of emissions is the sum of the accumulated 
emissions from the past, the emissions from signatories and the emissions from 
nonsignatories in the current period. The remain emissions is the cumulate emissions in 
the past with the natural decay factor denoted as ∈(0,1). Despite increases in carbon 
1) The emissions are by-products from the production. Considering the facilities and resources are 
constrained, we normalise the highest level of emissions to 1.
2) This restrictive assumption does not consider the technological improvement which is another 
important factor to IEAs. Having said that, the perceptions of sustainability is the objective in this 
study. The discussion on technological improvement is the task for the future studies.
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dioxide emissions by the human activities, the vegetation and oceans can absorb the 
cumulated emissions. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the decay rate is between 
zero and one. The later bracket shows the current aggregate emissions. Suppose  
countries3) join an IEA, the individual emissions of a signatory   in Period  is denoted as 
 ≥  , =1,…, and =1, 2. On the other hand, the individual emissions of a 
nonsignatory   in Period  is denoted as   , =+1,…,  and =1, 2.
Having defined the benefit and cost functions. In period , a country ′  net benefit 
function is 
π       
Each decision maker lives for one period and optimises its welfare simultaneously 
with respect to its current level of emissions as
maxπ  



    


  (eqn. 2)
As mentioned previously, given the initial stock of the pollutant, there is a two-stage 
game:
1. In the first stage, countries decide whether or not to join an IEA.
2. In the second stage, countries decide their emission in terms of their membership 
status.
I. Signatories move as one by determining a common emissions level to maximise 
the coalition welfare.
II. Nonsignatories decide their own emissions level to maximise their own 
individual welfare.
The discussion on the formation of self-enforcing IEAs follows Rubio and Ulph 
(2007), the membership of any country is determined by a random process such that the 
3)  is an integer value between 0 and  .
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probability of any country being a signatory in that period is simply the membership of 
the stable IEA in that period divided by the total number of countries. This probability is 
the same for all countries in each period. Two scenarios in the decision process have 
been shown in Table 1: (i) myopic (MYO), (ii) sustainable development (SD). The 
young generation faces the same objective function in both scenarios, while the policy 
goals for the old generation are different. In the MYO scenario, the old generation is 
myopic and the decision makers only concern their own welfare in Period 1. In the SD 
scenario, the old generation concerns not only its own welfare but also the expected 
welfare of the young generation. Besides, the sustainability criterion dictates that the 
welfare of the young generation cannot be worse than the welfare of the old generation. 
We would like to highlight that for the SD scenario, the expected welfare of the young 
generation is based on the membership status of the old generation. In Period 1, the old 
decision makers have the expectation and belief about the membership of the young 
generation when they consider the cross-generational welfare. This assumption is 
adequate because practical IEAs do not usually set an expiry date unless the policy goal 
has been achieved4). The young generation is expected to inherit the membership from 
the old generation. However, in Period 2, the young generation can withdraw from the 
coalition and participate freely in terms of their domestic situations. In other words, the 
coalition formation could be different in both periods5). 
The game is solved by backward induction. Section 2.1 discusses the young 
generation's two-stage decisions which include the emission plan and the membership 
status in Period 2. Then the old generation's two-stage decisions in Period 1 are discussed 
in two scenarios: section 2.2 illustrates the MYO scenario where the old generation cares 
about its welfare only; whilst section 2.3 illustrates the SD scenario where the old 
4) For example, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer in 1987.
5) For example, the Kyoto Protocol has two commitments periods. The first commitment period applies 
to emissions between 2008-2012, and the second commitment period applies to emissions between 
2013-2020. Japan, New Zealand, Russia and Canada (which withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 
2012) have participated in Kyoto's first-round but have not taken on new targets in the second 
commitment period. 
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generation cares about not only its welfare but also the young generation's.
1. Decisions in Period 2
1.1 Second-stage emissions game
Regardless of the decision makers are myopic or not, the young generation faces the 
same decision process. Suppose that   countries has decided to participate in the 
coalition in Period 2, so that the rest     countries are nonsignatories. Extended 
from (eqn. 2), a young nonsignatory   maximises its individual payoff as
maxπ 



   


  (eqn. 3)
where   is ’s emissions in Period 2. The total emissions   ∑   
∑   
   is the sum of the accumulated stock of emissions in the past period with 
the decay rate , as well as the aggregated emissions from signatories and nonsignatories 
in Period 2.
Hence, the optimal level of emissions for a young nonsignatory is
 
 
 
 (eqn. 4)
The derivative with respect to the parameter  of the emissions level    is 
ambiguous6). When the marginal cost of total emissions is smaller than 1, it implies that 
the higher technology level may incur more pollution. In light of the history of human 
6) A simple proof is below:
(1) take logarithms of both side ln
 ln
(2) take the derivative with respect to  , we have 
ln

 
 ln . 
So   is positive when  is less than 1 and negative when  is greater than 1.
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development, the more advanced technology we have, the more we would like to 
produce for the life convenience. Despite the technologies become more efficient and 
generate fewer pollutants per unit of product, the level of emissions could increase due to 
the increasing consumption of products. On the other hand, when the marginal cost of 
total emissions  is greater than 1, the pollution cost increases faster than the growth of 
benefit by the technology development. It implies that the more advanced technology 
would lower the emissions level.
A signatory attempts to maximise the coalition payoff with regard to the common 
emissions level  , ∀∈1,...,  . The coalition objective function is presented as 
max∏ ∑  
 


   


  (eqn. 5)
From (eqn. 5), the optimal emissions level for a young signatory   in Period 2 is
  
 
 
 (eqn. 6)

  < 0 and 
  < 0 mean the size of the IEA and the marginal cost of the total 
emissions would breakdown the optimal emissions level of a signatory. Since all 
signatories make a common decision to maximise the coalition payoff , the coalition 
emissions is the number of signatories times of an individual signatory's emissions level. 
When the coalition becomes bigger, this group effect motivates each signatory to have a 
larger individual emission reduction. Also, the high marginal cost would lead to a low 
emissions level. However, as mentioned earlier, the technology parameter (b) has 
multiple effects and its impact on the emissions level is ambiguous.
The payoffs of a nonsignatory j and a signatory i in Period 2 are
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 
  
 
 


   
 
 
    
 
  


 
 
 
 
 


   
 
 
    
 
  


The enlarged coalition formation benefits to every country 
  > 0 and 
  > 0). 
We also learnt that a nonsignatory has a higher payoff than a signatory does, because of 
the free-riding benefit for the nonsignatory.
1.2 First-stage membership game
Following D'Aspremont et al. (1983), a   -member stable coalition is found when 
two constraints below are satisfied
  ≤    (eqn. 7)
  ≤    (eqn. 8)
As mentioned earlier,   and   are the payoffs for a signatory and a nonsignatory 
respectively. The number in the parenthesis indicates the number of signatories in the 
IEA. The internal constraint (eqn. 7) implies the incentive of participation of a signatory 
 . A country would participate in a coalition as one of   member countries only if being 
a signatory is better than being a nonsignatory. When the number of signatories drops 
and the coalition is no longer profitable, the consequence is that the IEA could no longer 
exist and all countries suffer. On the other hand, the external constraint (eqn. 8) explains 
the incentive of a nonsignatory. A country would stay away from a coalition when the 
payoff of being an outsider is better than that of being the  -th member. When 
both constraints are satisfied, the coalition is considered as stable.
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Following, Section 2.2 and 2.3 discuss the decisions of the old generation in Period 1 
in the MYO and SD scenarios respectively. 
2. Decisions in Period 1 in the Myopic (MYO) scenario
2.1 Second-stage emissions game
In the myopic scenario, the decision makers care about the welfare in Period 1 only. 
Similar to the objective function of the young generation in Period 2, an old nonsignatory 
  maximises only its payoff with respect to its individual emissions level ( )
max



   


  (eqn. 9)
where   is the emissions level of a nonsignatory   in Period 1, and the total stock of 
emissions  .
Hence, the optimal emissions level of   is obtained from (eqn. 9). The myopic old 
generation emits the same level as the young generation does.
  
 
 
On the other hand, suppose there are   members, the coalition attempts to maximise 
the aggregate payoff with respect to the common emissions level 
max∏ ∑  
 


   


  (eqn. 10)
The first order derivative suggests that the number of signatories and marginal cost are 
negatively correlated with the optimal emissions level of a myopic old signatory. The 
optimal emissions level is presented as 
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  
 
 
The post-distribution payoffs for a myopic signatory   and a myopic nonsignatory   in 
period 1 are
 
  
 
 


   
 
 
    
 
  


 
  
 
 
 


   
 
 
    
 
  


2.2 First-stage membership game
Similar to (eqn. 7) and (eqn. 8), the stable coalition with   members in Period 1 can 
also be found when two constraints below are satisfied. 
  ≤    (eqn. 11)
  ≤    (eqn. 12)
  is the post-redistribution payoff when a country decides to participate in an IEA and 
  is the payoff of that country decides not to participate. The number in the parenthesis 
means the size of the IEA in Period 1.
It should be noted that IEAs being formed in the beginning of each period, the 
coalition formation in Period 1 () does not necessary remain the same to that in Period 
2 (). The emissions level and the welfare might be different when the formation size 
changes. Given an extreme example that the coalition size remains the same for two 
periods ( ), the emissions levels are the same in two periods. Having said that, we 
have learnt from (eqn.1) that the accumulated emissions is an extra cost to the young 
generation. The young generation would therefore have worse welfare than the old 
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generation. According to the concepts of sustainability defined previously, this can be 
labelled an unsustainable system.
　　
3. Decisions in Period 1 in the Sustainable development (SD) scenario
The result from the MYO scenario suggests that the system could be unsustainable if 
the formation size remains unchanged. In order to ensure a sustainable system, we now 
restructure the model for the sustainable development (SD) scenario in Period 1. The old 
generation has cross-generational altruism by concerning the welfares of two 
generations. In addition, the old generation has cross-generational fairness by setting up 
the sustainable criterion. The criterion ensures the social welfare of the young generation 
would be no worse than that of the old generation. The two-stage game is also solved by 
backward induction.
3.1 Second-stage emissions game
In the SD scenario, the old generation considers not only the welfare in Period 1 but 
also that of that in Period 2. Let π  denote the expected welfare of the young generation 
under the coalition formation in Period 1. As mentioned earlier, the membership of the 
young generation is expected to inherit the membership. So that if there are   
signatories in an IEA in Period 1, the expected coalition formation in Period 2 remains 
the same7). With this assumption, the old generation could predict the emissions level 
and the welfare of the young generation. 
An old nonsignatory  's objective function is presented as 
max 
           
≤   (eqn. 13)
7) However, the young generation could reform the coalition and decides its actual membership in 
Period 2. The young generation does not have to follow the expectation of the old generation.
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where   is the discount factor attached by one generation to the welfare of the next. The 
discount factor, in the range of 0 and 1, implies the weight of how much the old 
generation cares about the young generation. With the definition of sustainable 
development, decision makers consider the over-generational welfare. An old generation 
cares not only about the payoff at present but also that in the future. This setting implies 
cross-generational altruism, which the current generation sacrifice without asking 
anything in return from the future generation. The higher value of  , higher is the weight 
put on the young generation concerned by the old generation.
Inequality (eqn. 13) refers to the sustainability criterion of which the welfare of the 
future generation should not be worse than that of the present generation8). It implies 
cross-generational fairness that the old generation live no better than another. To do so, 
the constraint urges the old generation to adjust its emissions level for the cross- 
generational fairness.
Hence, the Lagrange function with respect to   is set up as
ℒ          (eqn. 14)
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the maximisation problem in (eqn. 14) are

ℒ                ≥   (eqn. 15)

ℒ   ≥  ≥         (eqn. 16)
8) I acknowledge that it is unusual to impose a non-declining welfare criterion in a two-period model 
where the welfare in Period 1 is compared with that in Period 2. Given that what happens in Period 
1 is irreversible but affects to the generation in Period 2, it will be necessary to reduce emissions in 
Period 1 for the purpose of sustainable development. This may not be a very satisfactory model with 
which to study the impact of the non-declining welfare constraint. However, the constraint is adequate 
to study sustainability.
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The members in the coalition will attempt to maximise the coalition welfare in two 
periods. Their membership status last for the expected payoff ∏ . The objective 
function of the old generation is
max∏ ∏
 ∑
     ∑     ∏≤ ∏
This can be rewritten in a Lagrangian with respect to   as
ℒ   ∏ ∏ ∏ ∏ (eqn. 17)
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the maximisation problem in (eqn. 17) are

ℒ                ≥   (eqn. 18)

ℒ  ∏ ∏≥  ≥ ∏ ∏  (eqn. 19)
To solve the problem, there are following four cases:
Case 1. No criterion is binding (  )
When no criterion is binding,    . From (eqn. 15) and (eqn. 18), the optimal 
levels of emissions for a nonsignatory j and a signatory i in Period 1 are 
   
 
 
      
 
The level of emissions of a signatory i is lower than that of a nonsignatory  . A further 
emission reduction is made by signatories, when the coalition is expanded. The result 
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also shows that the discount factor () and the emission decay rate () are correlated to 
the level of emissions. It means that, if the young generation is more valuable, the old 
generation would do more emission reduction , for the sake of the young generation.
Taking the expected number of signatories   into (eqn. 6), the expected level of 
emission for a signatory in Period 2 is yielded and it is higher than the emissions level in 
Period 1. This result is also applied to nonsignatories. Compared to the result in the 
MYO scenario in Section 2.2, the old generation emits fewer carbon emissions in the SD 
scenario.
Case 2. The sustainability criterion for signatories is binding ( , but  )
When the sustainability criterion for nonsignatories is not binding,   . From (eqn. 
15), the level of emissions for a nonsignatory   is 
   
 
 
On the other hand, when the criterion is binding for signatories,   > 0. The level of 
emissions of a signatory i can be derived from (eqn. 19)

              

  
 
 
 


  
 
 
    
 
  


 (eqn. 20)
Suppose the discount rate and the remaining emissions are very high (e.g., ≈  
≈ ), an old nonsignatory emits  
 
, which is less than the result in the MYO 
scenario. When the sustainability criterion for signatories is binding, from (eqn. 20), 
the level of emission for an old signatory is           
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   
 
  

. It is the technology parameter times the expected welfare of a young 
signatory to the power of the inverse technology parameter. On the other hand, either 
countries have a low discount rate (≈ ) or the remaining emissions becomes small 
(≈ ), an old nonsignatory emits  
 
 which is at the same level to the result in the 
MYO scenario. Because an extra cost from the remaining emission, old generation 
would emit less for the young generation.
Case 3. The sustainability criterion for nonsignatories is binding (   , but   )
When the sustainability criterion for nonsignatories is binding,    . The level of 
emissions of a nonsignatory j can be derived from (eqn. 16)

             

  
 
 


  
 
 
    
 
  


 (eqn. 21)
On the other hand, if the criterion for signatories is not binding,    . From (eqn. 
18), the level of emissions of a signatory i is therefore
     
 
Suppose the discount rate and the remaining emissions are very high (e.g. ≈   and 
≈ ), an old signatory emits  
 
 
 which is less than the result in the MYO 
scenario. It implies that the old generation reduces its emissions due to the concerns on 
the future generation and the unsolvable remaining pollutants. When the sustainability 
criterion for nonsignatories is binding, from (eqn. 21) we learn that the level of emission 
for an old nonsignatory                  which is the 
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technology parameter times the expected welfare of a young nonsignatory to the power 
of the inverse technology parameter. When either the discount rate or the remaining 
emissions are very low (e.g. ≈   or ≈ ), an old signatory emits  
 
 
 which is 
at the same level to the result in the MYO scenario. Because the concerns on the 
remaining emissions, an old nonsignatory emits less than that of a young nonsignatory.
Case 4. The sustainability criteria for all countries are binding ( ,  )
In this case,    and  . The levels of emissions of a nonsignatory   and a 
signatory   can be derived from (eqn. 16) and (eqn. 19) as

              

  
 
 
      
 
    
 
 

              

  
 
      
 
    
 
 
The discount factor () affects neither a signatory nor a nonsignatory. It does not mean 
the old generation concerns nothing about the future, but the sustainable criteria have to 
be accomplished. Having said that, the remaining emissions ratio () is an important 
factor to the level of emissions. When the remaining emissions is very small (≈ ), 
pollutants are absorbed by the nature, the old generation emits at the level as the 
technology parameter times the expected welfare of the young generation to the power of 
the inverse technology parameter. But if the nature cannot absorb the pollutants and the 
remaining emissions is at a very high level (≈ ), the old generation emits less for the 
extra cost from the remaining pollutants.
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The optimal levels of emissions for a signatory and a nonsignatory are not obvious. A 
numerical example in the following section can help our understanding on these results.
3.2 First-stage membership game
To find a stable coalition in the first period, the internal constraint and external 
constraint for the old generation can be rewritten as
     ≤       (eqn. 23)
     ≤       (eqn. 24)
The constraints with a cross-generational objective function imply that the decision 
makers take the expected welfare of the young generation into account. The constraint 
(eqn. 23) shows that when the welfare of being a nonsignatory is not higher than that of 
being a signatory, the coalition is stable internally. On the other hand, the constraint (eqn. 
24) shows that the coalition is stable externally, when there is no signatory have the 
incentive to leave.
Consider the case of    where all countries join the IEA, the individual levels of 
emissions are     
 
 in Period 1 and    
 
 in Period 2. The expected 
emissions level in Period 2 is higher than that in Period 1. This implies that the old 
generation has not only a lower benefit but also a lower cost to the young generation. It is 
unclear to claim whether this is a sustainable system. Hence, the following simulation 
provides a numerical example to illuminate the result.
III. Simulation analysis
Given =10 countries9), we assume the gap between generations is five decades 
because the international treaties are usually valid for a long term. The remaining 
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<Table 2> Individual level of emissions and welfare of a nonsignatory and 
a signatory in two periods in the myopic (MYO) scenario

 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.1
0.02


 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 


0.1


 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 


0.5


 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 


0.9


 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 


Given   and   . From left top to down in each cell are the emissions of 
a nonsignatory and a signatory in period 1 and a nonsignatory and a signatory in period 2 
respectively in the MYO scenario. From right top to down are their individual payoffs. 
emissions () is set as (100-0.866)% per year from the natural annual removal rate of 
CO2 stock given by Nordhaus (1994). The parameters of benefit () is set from 0.01 to 
0.1 and the marginal cost of total emissions () is set from 0.01 to 0.9.10)
Table 2 shows the individual level of emissions and welfare in the myopic (MYO) 
scenario. As mentioned previously, a signatory produces less pollution than a 
nonsignatory does. Hence, the welfare of a signatory is always less than that of a 
nonsignatory in both periods. The individual optimal emissions levels of signatories and 
9) We acknowledge that might not a large number, compared to the numerical examples in Barrett 
(1994) and Rubio and Ulph (2007). It is more difficult to find a robust result in our exponential 
benefit function with a case of large number of countries. Hence, this assumption is adequate to 
represent an international negotiation while a robust result could be found.
10) Here we assume the marginal cost is at the range of 0 and 1. As we mentioned in footnote 6, when 
the marginal cost is less than 1, the higher technology will increase the emission level. It implies 
that when the advanced technology would lead to the increase of emissions for the life convenience.
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<Table 3> Individual emission levels and the welfare of a nonsignatory and 
a signatory in two periods in the sustainable development (SD) scenario

 0.01 0.02 0.05
0.02


 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 


0.1


 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 


0.5


 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 


0.6


 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 


0.9


 
 
 
 


 

 
 
 
 


 

 
 
 
 



Given   and   . From left top to down in each cell are the emissions of 
a nonsignatory and a signatory in period 1 and a nonsignatory and a signatory in period 2 
respectively in the SD scenario. From right top to down are their individual payoffs. 
The cells with star * refer to the sustainability criterion is binding.
nonsignatories in two different periods are positively related to the technology level () 
and negatively related to the marginal cost of total emissions ().
The membership decision is determined ex ante the emissions game. A consistent 
result in the MYO scenario suggests that a 2-member coalition in Period 1, and a larger 
5-member coalition in Period 2. The individual level of emissions and welfare are related 
to the size of IEA. The nonsignatories generate the same level of emissions in two 
periods, whilst the signatories emit less in Period 2. When the welfares for generations 
are compared, the old generation has a higher welfare than the young generation. In other 
words, the system in the MYO scenario is always unsustainable.
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Table 3 reports the individual level of emissions and welfare in the sustainable 
development (SD) scenario. Here, the discount rate () is set as 0.5 as the weight of 
concerns on the future generation. The level of emissions in Period 1 is less than that in 
Period 2 in general. When the technology is more advanced (higher ), the emissions 
level increases but the welfare shrinks. On the other hand, when the marginal cost of the 
total emissions () increases, countries are more aware of the damage and reduce the 
levels of emissions. The marginal cost is positively related to the emissions level but 
negatively to the welfare.
The cells with stars refer to the binding sustainability criterion that the expected 
welfare in Period 2 is worse than that in Period 1. The system could be sustainable in 
most cases, but not always. We have to emphasise that the sustainability criterion is for 
the old generation in Period 1 only. When the criterion is binding, the expected welfare 
in Period 2 is equal to that in Period 1. However, due to the coalition formation might be 
changed in Period 2, the actual welfare in Period 2 is not necessary to be the expected 
welfare. The numerical example shows that the criteria are not binding when the 
marginal cost of total emissions is high. In the SD scenario, the system is usually 
sustainable as the welfare of the young generation is higher than the welfare of the old 
generation. However, when the marginal cost is high, the system could be unsustainable 
as the young generation might yield a lower level of welfare.
Compared to the result in the MYO scenario in Table 2, the level of emissions of SD 
scenario is far less than that of MYO scenario. In addition, the welfare of signatories and 
nonsignatories in Period 2 in the SD scenario are usually higher than those in the MYO 
scenario. In other words, the SD scenario is better to maintain a sustainable system than 
the MYO scenario.
Table 4 reports the coalition formation of IEAs in the SD scenario. When the marginal 
cost of the stock of emissions (γ) is low, countries have a higher incentive to form an IEA 
and a grand coalition is possible. Countries have a higher incentive to form an IEA when 
the marginal cost is low. The marginal cost is negatively related to the coalition 
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<Table 4> Number of signatories out of 10 for the parameter of the level of 
technology and the marginal cost of the total emissions in the SD scenario

 0.01 0.02 0.05
0.02 1010
10
10
10
10
0.1 1010
10
10
10
10
0.5 38
3
8
3
8
0.6 36
3
6
3
6
0.9 66
6
6
6
6
The discount rate  is 0.5. From top to down in each cell report the number of signatories 
in the periods 1 and 2. 
formation in Period 2. However, the marginal cost has an ambiguous impact on the 
formation in Period 1. Compared to the result in MYO scenario where there are always a 
2-member coalition in Period 1 and 5-member in Period 2, the formation in the SD 
scenario is larger than that in the MYO scenario. On the other hand, the level of 
technology () has no impact on the coalition formation in the SD scenario, while there is 
also no impact in the MYO scenario. As mentioned earlier in section 2.3, it might due to 
the multiple effects of the technology development. 
Table 5 shows the sizes of stable IEAs in the SD scenario in relation to the levels of 
discount rate () and the marginal cost of total emissions () when the technology level 
  is set at 0.05. A grand coalition happens when the marginal cost is very low. However, 
the marginal cost does not show a clear correlation with the coalition formation in two 
periods. It seems that the formation in Period 2 decreases when the marginal cost 
increases, while that in Period 1 may firstly shrink then expanded. When the discount 
rate () is very small, it implies that the old generation's preference weighting attached 
by one generation to the next, the formation in Period 1 could be very small but a grand 
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<Table 5> Number of signatories out of 10 for the parameter of the 
perceptions of sustainability and the marginal cost of the total emissions 
in the SD scenario (=0.05)

 0.01 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
0.02 1010
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
0.4 210
3
10
3
10
4
10
4
10
0.5 210
3
9
3
8
3
8
3
7
0.9 66
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
From top to down in each cell report the number of signatories in the periods 1 and 2. 
coalition is still possible in Period 2. It is interesting that the discount rate has small but 
ambiguous effect on the coalition formation.
We have to note that a robust outcome is not found when the level of discount rate s 
more than 0.05, however, the impact of the discount rate is not as significant as the 
marginal cost of total emission. The coalition usually expands when the marginal cost 
increases.
IV. Conclusions
This study examines the perceptions of sustainability in IEAs by building a two-stage 
two-period game. We firstly consider a myopic (MYO) scenario in which the old 
generation is myopic and does not care about the young generation. It implies that there 
is no fairness and altruism between generations. The old generation only concerns about 
its payoff in Period 1. It is suggested that only a small size (2 members) coalition could 
possibly be formed in Period 1 and a larger (5 members) coalition in Period 2. The 
simulation results show that the level of emissions decreases when the marginal cost 
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increases since the environmental damages are awarded. On the other hand, a more 
advanced technology development level could encourage countries to emit more for the 
life convenience and have lower welfare. Overall, the system in the MYO scenario is 
demonstrated to be unsustainable.
This study then builds a model in the sustainable development (SD) scenario which its 
preference weighting attached by one generation to the next and the sustainability 
criterion to ensure welfare is non-declining over time. There are two characters in the SD 
scenario: the intergenerational fairness and altruism. Firstly, the countries have 
cross-generational altruism that the old generation would sacrifice without asking for 
return from the young generation. They care about not only their welfare in Period 1 but 
also that of the young generation in Period 2. Secondly, the countries care about the 
cross-generational fairness whereby the old generation should not make the young 
generation worse off. When both are taken into account, a coalition will be expanded. 
The numerical example indicates that the marginal cost of the total emissions is the 
crucial factor for the formation of IEAs. Only when the marginal cost is low, a 
sustainable system can be succeeded. Having said that, the impact of the discount rate is 
insignificant. The concerns on the future generation may lead to the coalition in Period 1 
expand but that in Period 2 shrinks. This unusual case implies that the old generation are 
more likely to participate when the concern is stronger, but the young generation may 
withdraw since environmental threats have mitigated. On the other hand, the technology 
development level has no impact on the formation. The technological advancement may 
lead to a more efficient production per unit of emissions, whilst it also encourages 
countries to emit more in total and have a lower level of welfare. 
This study confirms the importance of the awareness of sustainability to creating 
IEAs. The results provide policy advice to international environmental conventions. 
When decision makers are myopic, the system is unsustainable even if an IEA is formed. 
Only when sustainable development is taken into account, the system could be 
sustainable. However, it must be noted that the criterion does not guarantee a sustainable 
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system. In a few cases, the system is still unsustainable because the young generation 
could make a different decision to what the old generation expected. Regardless of the 
existence of IEAs, international environmental conventions shall not neglect the fundamental 
goal to pursue sustainable development.
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